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Abstract.  This paper presents an applied test of behavioral issues related to health 7 
insurance purchases.  Unlike many academic studies, we could use in-depth individual 8 
interviews of a large representative sample from the general public (N=476).  We 9 
examined the effects of statistical information on insurance purchases, with special 10 
attention to their usefulness for clients.  The statistical information that had the most 11 
interesting effects, “individual own past-cost information,” unfortunately enhanced 12 
adverse selection, which we could directly verify because we knew the real health 13 
costs of the clients.  For a prescriptive evaluation this drawback must be weighted 14 
against some advantages: a desirable interaction with risk attitude, increased customer 15 
satisfaction, and increased cost awareness.  Descriptively, ambiguity seeking was 16 
found rather than ambiguity aversion, and no risk aversion was found for loss 17 
outcomes.  Both findings, obtained in a natural decision context, deviate from 18 
traditional views in risk theory but agree with prospect theory.  We confirmed prospect 19 
theory’s reflection at the level of group averages, but falsified it at the individual level. 20 
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1. Introduction 23 
 In many countries, health insurance is only partly funded publically, and clients 24 
have to decide on how much extra coverage they want to obtain by purchasing 25 
supplemental private insurance (Bundorf & Simon 2006).  For this decision, 26 
information about the risks at health expenses is useful.  Thus, Winter et al. (2006) 27 
wrote, in a study on the Medicare Part D program for elderly clients introduced in the 28 
US on January 1, 2006, where private insurance companies and health maintenance 29 
organizations (HMOs) have to compete to offer supplemental insurance: 30 
If the market components of Medicare Part D is to be successful, in the 31 
sense that it provides choices that consumers want, and achieves the 32 
efficiencies it seeks, it will probably be necessary for Medicare to expand its 33 
effort to reach all consumers and provide them with information and 34 
assistence in making wise choices. … If elders are to be given sound advice 35 
on the merits of enrollment and alternative plans, community-based, 36 
privately financed advocacy organizations are likely to have to take the 37 
initiative.  … At present, even the most basic information on transition 38 
probabilities for pharmacy bills and health conditions that is needed for 39 
careful calculation of the value of insurance plans is not publicly available.  40 
(pp. 7933-7934).   41 
McFadden (2006, p. 23, concluding paragraph) gave the same arguments.  42 
Developments as in the US simultaneously took place in the Netherlands, the country 43 
where our study was conducted.  Plans to abolish complete public coverage for health 44 
insurance were developed in 1995, when this study was initiated by the Dutch health 45 
insurance company Zorg en Zekerheid, and were finally implemented on January 1, 46 
2006. 47 
 This paper reports an empirical study into providing clients with statistical 48 
information about health costs.  We study the effects of such information on the 49 
clients’ willingness to take insurance (WTT), for a sample of N = 476 subjects 50 
representative of the lower 2/3 income class of the Dutch population.  Our main 51 
interest concerns the desirability of such effects for the clients, i.e. whether it 52 
enhances choices that they want.  In addition, our study provides descriptive insights 53 
into the risk and ambiguity attitudes of a representative sample of the lower 2/3 54 
income class of the Dutch population. 55 
 Clients of the Dutch health insurance company Zorg en Zekerheid (with 56 
compulsory insurance so that there was no selection bias) were asked for their WTT 57 
both before the receipt of information about statistics of health expenses, and after.  58 
Thus, the effect of the statistical information could be measured.  We were also 59 
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informed about the health expenses of the clients by the insurance company.  Thus we 60 
could measure how the WTT, and the effect of statistical information on WTT, 61 
depended on both risk aversion and health expenses.  The extra statistical information 62 
that clients received entails a reduction of ambiguity (in its technical decision-63 
theoretic sense), so that our data also give insights into ambiguity attitudes. 64 
 There is a wide interest in risk and ambiguity attitudes of the general public, 65 
rather than of the often-studied students (Donkers, Melenberg, & van Soest 2001; 66 
Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, & Jonker 2002; Harrison et al. 2004; Harrison & List 67 
2004; Starmer 2000).  Our collaboration with Zorg en Zekerheid provided a unique 68 
opportunity to obtain such data.  Common academic budgets do not allow for large-69 
scale intensive experiments with representative samples from a population scattered 70 
over several cities and with each subject interviewed individually at their home, as 71 
could be done in this study.  Thus, we could obtain a refined measurement of risk 72 
attitudes from the general public.  Because risk aversion is rarely measured at the 73 
individual level in insurance studies, its positive impact on WTT, while widely 74 
assumed, has rarely been verified empirically before (see Barsky et al. 1997, who 75 
could not use refined measurements through individual interviews).  The information 76 
about individual health expenses as we had is also rarely available.  This information 77 
allowed an empirical verification of adverse selection at the individual level. 78 
 The effects of risk information on WTT are of interest from the marketing 79 
perspective, for example if an insurer seeks to maximize revenues and profits.  We 80 
will, indeed, formulate recommendations for such applications.  The main research 81 
question of this study, raised by Zorg en Zekerheid, was, however, a prescriptive one, 82 
to be considered from the perspective of the clients of Zorg en Zekerheid: To what 83 
extent do the effects of risk information help clients make insurance decisions that 84 
better fit their own preferences, and which form of statistical information is optimal 85 
for this purpose?  We will obviously separate the empirical facts inferred from our 86 
experiment, and relevant to empirical applications, from the prescriptive 87 
interpretations added later.  The design, definition of indexes, and statistical analyses 88 
will, however, be primarily oriented towards those aspects of the data that serve to 89 
solve our main research question.  The effect of risk information on risky decisions of 90 
the general public, and the prescriptive desirability thereof, is of general interest.  It is, 91 
for instance, relevant for preventive health care, traffic safety, counseling for risky 92 
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medical treatments, and banks informing clients about risk profiles of financial 93 
porfolios.   94 
 We considered WTT for supplemental insurance against a deductible of Dfl. 200 95 
(approximately $140 in 1997) per year, the deductible envisioned in 1995 when the 96 
subjects were interviewed.  The deductible introduced in the Netherlands in 2006 is 97 
somewhat lower (€100), and it is higher ($250) for the Medicare part D program in 98 
the US.  The supplemental insurance considered in this paper provides reimbursement 99 
for any deductible paid, so that full coverage is obtained after all. 100 
 Our empirical findings come from a natural environment and concern choices 101 
commonly faced by people when interacting with their insurance company.  They 102 
shed new light on some controversial empirical questions, such as whether the general 103 
public is risk averse or risk seeking for losses, and whether ambiguity aversion and 104 
prospect theory’s reflection effect hold for the general public.  Since Keynes (1921), 105 
Knight (1921), and Ellsberg (1961), there have been many studies into the difference 106 
between risk (known probabilities) and uncertainty or ambiguity (unknown 107 
probabilities); see Gilboa (2004).  These studies commonly considered artificial 108 
constructions of ambiguity, such as through urns with numbers of balls deliberately 109 
kept secret.  Our natural stimuli will reveal phenomena different than those found 110 
with the commonly used artificial stimuli. 111 
 Further specific research questions addressed in this paper concern whether the 112 
effects of the various forms of statistical information on WTT interact with the risk 113 
aversion of the clients, and with their health expenses.  We discuss whether the 114 
interactions found are desirable from various perspectives (marketing, societal, 115 
client), as well as which form of statistical information is most desirable from the 116 
various perspectives. 117 
2. Method 118 
 Details of our experiment, in particular concerning the hypothetical and 119 
subjective nature of the survey questions, are discussed in Section 5 and in Appendix 120 
A. 121 
 Participants.—N=496 clients of Zorg en Zekerheid were sampled, all with Dutch 122 
as native language, aged 18−69.  The sampling was done sequentially, maintaining 123 
representativeness regarding age, gender, and income for the various subgroups of 124 
interest in this research.  The clients were all on national health service, which means 125 
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that they belonged to the lower 2/3 income class of the Dutch population.  For our 126 
clients, insurance is compulsory so that being insured did not generate self-selection.  127 
The clients predominantly did not have an academic training, which makes them 128 
complementary to the participants recruited in most experimental investigations.  The 129 
clients in our study were well motivated because the research was organized by their 130 
own health insurance company, and the general public is in general willing to 131 
contribute to health investigations (Bleichrodt & Pinto 2005). 132 
 Procedure.—Thirty professional interviewers were hired.  They received a day's 133 
training as preparation, and visited all clients at their private homes.  Interviews lasted 134 
approximately one hour per client, of which half an hour was dedicated to questions 135 
regarding the research reported here, and the other half hour was dedicated to another 136 
research regarding insurance for dental care.  Clients were called by phone after the 137 
interview to verify that the procedures had been carried out correctly prior to payment 138 
of the interviewers.  No interviewer had to be discarded. 139 
 Stimuli; general.—We only describe the variables relevant to this research.  The 140 
stimuli were tested in a pilot study consisting of 10 clients, and were approved by a 141 
patients’ interest group (“Regionaal Patiënten/Consumenten Platform Leiden”).  In 142 
short, the independent variable is the form of statistical information given to the 143 
clients, and the dependent variable is the effect of information on WTT.  Further 144 
factors are risk attitude and costs.  We next describe these stimuli in detail. 145 
 Risk attitude.—Fourteen hypothetical choice questions about gambles for money 146 
were mailed to the clients before the interview, so that they could prepare.  These 147 
questions were discussed in the beginning of the interview.  In each question, a choice 148 
had to be made between a risky prospect and a sure amount of money.  The first seven 149 
choices concerned gains, i.e. nonnegative amounts of money, and were described as 150 
wheel-of-fortune questions to the clients.  The last seven choices concerned losses and 151 
were described as wheel-of-misfortune questions.  Both the gain- and the loss-152 
questions were preceded by one practice question.  Appendix B presents the visual 153 
displays of two choices.  Tables 1 and 2 display the probabilities and outcomes of the 154 
prospects.  Only the nonzero outcomes and their probabilities are denoted.  To save 155 
space, the tables hereafter also display choice proportions that will be discussed in the 156 
results section. 157 
 158 
159 
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TABLE 1.  Risky choices for gains 159 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 
risky prospect (0.50, 300)  (0.50, 200) (0.01, 200) (0.05, 100) (0.50, 96) (0.95, 72) (0.95, 100)
safe option 20 100 10 14 39 55 78 
proportion of 
risky choices 
0.72 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.50 0.60 0.63 
In G1 the choice is between a fifty-fifty prospect yielding Dfl. 300 or nothing, and a 160 
safe option yielding Dfl. 20 for sure; the other choices are similar.  In prospect choice 161 
G1, 72% of the clients chose the risky fifty-fifty prospect of Dfl. 300 or nothing, and 162 
28% chose the safe option of Dfl. 20 for sure;  the other percentages are similar. 163 
 164 
TABLE 2.  Risky choices for losses 165 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 
risky prospect (0.05,−200)  (0.50,−200) (0.01,−200) (0.05,−100) (0.10,−50) (0.10,−200)(0.95,−100) 
safe option 
 − 75 − 100 − 3 −8 − 8  −23  − 84 
proportion of 
risky choices 
0.76 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.33 
In L1 the choice is between a prospect yielding a loss of Dfl. 200 with probability 0.05 166 
and no loss otherwise, and a safe option yielding a loss of Dfl. 75 for sure.  In prospect 167 
choice L1, 76% of the clients chose the risky prospect of losing Dfl. 200 with 168 
probability 0.05, and 24% chose the safe option of losing Dfl. 75 for sure. 169 
 170 
 Choices G1 and L1 serve to detect extreme risk aversion, for clients who 171 
invariably choose the sure amount no matter how favorable the risky prospect is.  In 172 
choices G2 and L2, the sure outcomes are the expectations of the risky options.  These 173 
choices provide benchmarks for whether clients are risk averse, risk neutral, or risk 174 
seeking.  The other prospects were taken from Tversky & Kahneman (1992, G3, G4, 175 
G7, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7) and from Birnbaum et al. (1992, G5, G6).  The particular 176 
outcomes and probabilities were chosen because in each of these choices the 177 
mentioned references found 50% preference for either prospect, suggesting that they 178 
optimally distinguish between individuals.  For pragmatic reasons, we matched 179 
dollars (the unit used in the references mentioned) and guilders (the unit used in our 180 
experiment) numerically, and not in value.  We incorporated various levels of 181 
probability because there will be various levels of health among our clients and, 182 
correspondingly, various probabilities of costs. 183 
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 We also asked three risky choices that were framed as insurance decisions.  In 184 
each question, an annual premium was specified and a, never higher, annual average 185 
of costs for the case of no supplemental insurance.  The clients were asked to express 186 
their subjective willingness to buy supplemental insurance on a scale from 1 (surely 187 
will not buy) to 7 (surely buy).  Table 3 displays the questions.  Again, to save space, 188 
the table also displays results of mean willingness to buy that will be discussed in the 189 
results section. 190 
 191 
TABLE 3.  Prospect choices in an insurance context 192 
  I1  I2  I3 
premium 132 144 180 
average costs 125 144 150 
mean willingness to buy 0.45 0.55 0.51 
Three insurance choice questions with annual premium and average costs specified.  193 
In I1, the choice is between insurance at premium 132 or no insurance with average 194 
costs 125.  In I1, the mean subjective willingness to buy was 0.45. 195 
 196 
 Information provision; three groups of clients, and three summary statistics per 197 
client.—Table 4 displays the forms of information considered in this paper, explained 198 
next.  A 3 × 3 between-within design will result.  The clients were divided into five 199 
groups.  Each group received information about a different summary statistic.  Two 200 
summary statistics, “badnews probabilities” of costs exceeding Dfl. 0 and costs 201 
exceeding Dfl. 200, and “goodnews probabilities” of costs not exceeding these levels 202 
(n = 203), did not yield significant effects.  Apparently, two such probabilities do not 203 
entail enough information to affect choice.  For brevity, these results will not be 204 
reported.  Three summary statistics (the between-subjects variable in our 3×3 design) 205 
remain: 206 
 207 
(A) Total costs: Average annual health care costs, which is the sum of the costs 208 
specified in (B) hereafter. 209 
(B) Specified costs: Average annual costs specified for seven health care services: (a) 210 
Hospital care; (b) physician; (c) paramedical care (physiotherapy, speach therapist, 211 
remedial therapy, etc); (d) prescription drugs; (e) ancillary equipments (f) obstetrics 212 
and maternity care; (g) transportation. 213 
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(C) Probabilities (“probabilistic information”): The probability of each of the 214 
following four events: Dfl. 0 costs, costs between Dfl. 0 and Dfl. 100, costs between 215 
Dfl. 100 and Dfl. 200, costs exceeding Dfl. 200.  216 
 217 
Per client, the information about the summary statistics was provided at three levels 218 
of aggregation: 219 
 220 
(1) Population (throughout this paper: all clients of Zorg en Zekerheid). 221 
(2) Reference group, i.e. clients of the same gender and age interval (18−29, 30−39, 222 
40−49, 50−59, 60−69 years). 223 
(3) Individual.  224 
 225 
The level of aggregation is the within-subjects variable in our 3×3 design.  At the 226 
individual level, clients were informed about their personal costs over the last year.  227 
This information does not comprise randomness and, hence, was not provided to the 228 
clients who received probabilistic information.  Thus, in total, 3 × 3 − 1 = 8 forms of 229 
information were considered, displayed in Table 4.  The clients always received the 230 
three aggregated levels of information sequentially, first about the population, then 231 
about the reference group, and finally, if relevant, at the individual level. 232 
 233 
 234 
 235 
 236 
 237 
 238 
 239 
 240 
 241 
 242 
Each client faced all questions in one row. 243 
 244 
 245 
 Costs.—Unlike most other studies, we did not derive costs indirectly from 246 
(subjective) assessments of clients (Finkelstein 2004).  Instead, for the clients who 247 
received information about their health costs over the preceding year (1994; total or 248 
specified), this information was also provided to us by the insurance company.  Thus, 249 
we have the exact real costs available.   250 
level of 
aggregation given 
first: population 
level of aggregation 
given second: 
reference group 
level of 
aggregation given 
last: individual 
total costs 
specified costs 
probabilistic 
information 
++
+ +
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
TABLE 4: Eight different forms of information about costs, with respect to various 
summary statistics (rows) and various levels of aggregation (columns) 
within- 
     subjects between- 
        subjects 
− 
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 251 
 Subjective willingness to take supplemental insurance.—Clients were asked to 252 
express their willingness to take supplemental insurance on a scale from 1 to 7.  This 253 
scale, normalized to a 0−1 scale, is used as the index of the willingness to take 254 
supplemental insurance in the main analysis.  It is denoted WTT henceforth.  WTT 255 
was measured before the provision of information, and after each of the three forms of 256 
information that was provided to each client.  Contrary to prior plans, we did not 257 
specify a premium for reasons explained in Appendix A. 258 
 Subjective evaluations of the information.—For each form of information 259 
received, four subjective evaluation questions were asked to the clients.  The 260 
questions concerned (a) clarity, (b) comprehensibility, (c) general usefulness, (d) 261 
usefulness in decisions, and (e) whether the statistic was higher or lower than 262 
expected, each on a seven-point scale.  The clients were also asked at which level of 263 
aggregation they would most like to receive information in the future.264 
 Analyses.—The effect of a form of information was defined as the WTT directly 265 
after receipt of that form of information, minus the first WTT that was measured 266 
before any receipt of information.  For example, the effect of individual-cost 267 
information for a client was the fourth WTT elicited from the client minus the first.  268 
Order effects are discussed in Section 5. 269 
 Clients with costs exceeding Dfl. 405 (the median cost) were classified as high-270 
cost, the others as low-cost.  We received the information about individual costs only 271 
for subjects who were given cost-information (total or specified; n = 184).  Because 272 
the cost variable was higly skewed, we used a transformation for correlational 273 
analyses, as follows: 0 → 1 (16.8%), (0,100] → 2 (15.8%), (100,200] → 3 (10.3%), 274 
(200,1000] → 4 (26.6%), and (1000,∞) → 5 (30.4%), with percentages of clients 275 
indicated between brackets.  The particular thresholds were chosen beause of their 276 
psychological meaning, where 200 is particularly important because it is the level of 277 
the deductible. 278 
 A risk-aversion index, ordering clients regarding their degree of risk aversion, 279 
was constructed as the average of three scores: (a) The number of safe choices in the 280 
gain prospects; (b) the number of safe choices in the loss prospects; (c) the 281 
willingness to buy in the insurance context.  All of these variables were normalized to 282 
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a 0−1 scale before their average was taken.  In this manner, the risk-aversion index is 283 
automatically normalized too. 284 
 For the main research question of this paper, which single form of information 285 
gives the best effect, we used paired t-tests to compare WTT before and WTT after 286 
receipt of information.4  Wilcoxon ranked signs tests revealed the same patterns and 287 
are not reported.  We use the following abbreviations for two-tailed paired t-tests; ms: 288 
p ≤ 0.10 (significant if one-tailed); *: p ≤ 0.05; **: p ≤ 0.01; ***: p ≤ 0.001. 289 
3.  Results on Risk Attitudes and Effects of Information 290 
20 clients were dropped because, due to lack of understanding or for other reasons, 291 
they could not answer the questions; 476 remained.  The main results concern the 292 
interactions of the effects with risk aversion and costs, and will be presented in 293 
Subsection 3.4. 294 
3.1.   Risk Attitudes 295 
 Tables 1 and 2 in the preceding section already gave the proportions of risky 296 
choices in the prospect choices.  Choice G2 exhibits risk aversion (chi = 65.8, df = 1, 297 
p < 0.001), and choice L2 risk neutrality (chi = 1.58, df = 1, p = 0.21).  For the three 298 
risk-attitude questions framed as insurance, Table 3 in the preceding section gave the 299 
means of subjective willingness to buy, normalized to a 0−1 scale. 300 
 We tested the internal consistency of the risk aversion scale by means of a 301 
reliability analysis.  Cronbach’s alpha was 0.75, which exceeds the common 302 
acceptability cutoff point of 0.70 (Nunnally & Bernstein 1994).  No removal of any 303 
item improved reliability. 304 
 The results of the prospect questions L2 and L6 suggest that slightly more than 305 
50% of our sample is risk averse for the relevant outcome domain.  Because our, 306 
obviously debatable, policy recommendations in Section 6 will primarily concern 307 
risk-averse clients, we used a conservative criterion for classifying clients as risk 308 
averse: The more risk-averse half of our sample was classified as risk averse and the 309 
other half as risk seeking.  Besides correlational results, we also report analyses based 310 
                                               
4
 We did not use analysis of variance because we were interested in single forms of information; only 
single forms of information will be implemented.  The asymmetric role of WTT before receipt relative 
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on median splits.  The latter reduce statistical power but their results are best suited 311 
for the policy recommendations considered later. 312 
 The median of the risk aversion index constructed from the gains, losses, and 313 
insurance questions, was 0.51.5  The index was between 0 and 0.50 for 225 clients, 314 
who were classified as risk seeking.  The index exceeded 0.50 for 232 clients who 315 
were classified as risk averse.  This classification is used in our main analysis and is 316 
discussed further in Section 4. 317 
 In agreement with common findings (Barsky et al. 1997), there was a positive 318 
relation between risk aversion and being female, having a low income, a large family, 319 
a low education, and a high age, but the relation was significant only for the latter two 320 
variables (r = 0.12, p = 0.01 for both).  These relations were the same for gains as for 321 
losses, though usually stronger for gains.  The risk aversion index for gains (G1−G7) 322 
was positively related to the index for losses (L1−L7; r = 0.55, p < 0.001).  Risk 323 
aversion strongly influences WTT (r = 0.36, p < 0.001), as will be further illustrated 324 
in Figures 1 and 2.  WTT also correlates positively with the risk-aversion index for 325 
gain-prospect choices (r = 0.10, p = 0.03) and the risk-aversion index for loss-326 
prospect choices (r = 0.12, p = 0.02). 327 
3.2.   Effects of Information on WTT; Results of the Whole Sample 328 
 Table 5 gives numerical statistics.  It displays the WTT before and after the 329 
receipt of information and, thus, shows the effects of information on average WTT for 330 
the whole sample of clients.  The most interesting results will also be depicted in 331 
Figures 1 and 2.   332 
 The three forms of information about reference groups had effects similar to the 333 
information about the population, but less pronounced.  For brevity, these forms of 334 
information will not be analyzed further.  Information about individualized costs and 335 
about probabilities neither have much effect on group means.  These forms of 336 
information will, however, reveal interesting effects in detailed analyses described 337 
later, unlike the forms just excluded. The difference in WTTbefore between total and 338 
                                                                                                                                      
to the WTTs after further illustrates that analysis of variance is not suited to answer our main research 
questions. 
5
 It is a coincidence that this median happens to lie almost exactly at the 0.50 level of the risk aversion 
index. 
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specified costs is due to between-group randomness, and nonsignificant under an 339 
independent samples t-test (t186 = 1.13, p = 0.26).  340 
 341 
TABLE 5.  Mean and standard deviation (SD) of WTT before and after the receipt of 342 
information of the whole sample   343 
 Population reference group Individual 
Total 
costs 
WTTbefore: 0.51 (0.43) 
WTTafter: 0.59*(0.43) 
WTTbefore:0.51 (0.43) 
WTTafter: 0.56 (0.42) 
WTTbefore: 0.51 (0.43) 
WTTafter: 0.54 (0.44) 
specified 
costs 
WTTbefore: 0.58 (0.40) 
WTTafter: 0.69***(0.38) 
WTTbefore: 0.58 (0.40) 
WTTafter: 0.64ms(0.39) 
WTTbefore6: 0.59 (0.40) 
WTTafter: 0.61 (0.42) 
Proba-
bilistic 
 
WTTbefore: 0.54 (0.40) 
WTTafter: 0.59ms(0.36) 
WTTbefore: 0.54 (0.40) 
WTTafter: 0.56 (0.36) 
 
− 
Significant effects (= changes in WTT) are underlined. 344 
 345 
3.3.  Brief Discussion of Whole-Sample Results 346 
 The increases of average WTT for the whole sample generated by population-347 
cost information may be of interest from the marketing perspective of maximizing 348 
revenues of insurance policies.  They, however, give no clear information about our 349 
main research question, being how to help clients make decisions that are optimal for 350 
themselves.  There is no prior reason why it would be good or bad for clients to take 351 
more or less insurance.  Information relevant to the prescriptive perspective will be 352 
revealed by analyses of subgroups, presented in the following subsections and in 353 
Figures 1 and 2. 354 
3.4.  Interaction Effects of the Five Most Interesting Forms of Information 355 
 As explained in Subsection 3.2, five forms of information remain, about 356 
population costs or individual costs, each specified either per seven services or only as 357 
the sumtotal of these, and, fifth and last, probabilistic information (always referring to 358 
the population and not to the reference group henceforth).  We examine the 359 
dependence of the effects of information on risk aversion and costs.  Table 6 presents 360 
correlations and partial correlations.  Unfortunately, information about costs during 361 
the preceding year was not available for the group that received probabilistic 362 
                                               
6
 WTTbefore is not constant in the second row because of different missing subjects. 
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information. 363 
 364 
TABLE 6.  Correlations of effect with risk aversion and with costs for each of the five 365 
forms of information 366 
 total popu-
lation costs 
specified po-
pulation costs 
total indivi-
dual costs 
specified indi-
vidual costs 
probabilistic 
risk aversion 0.02 (n = 81) 0.05 (n = 97) 0.07 (n = 81) 0.22*(n = 96) 0.18 (n = 82) 
Costs 
−0.11 (n =81) 0.08 (n =103) 0.08 (n = 81) 0.27**( n = 102) −    
Risk aversion 
controling 
for costs 
0.02 (n = 76) 0.07 (n = 92) 0.06 (n = 76) 0.19ms(n = 91) 
−    
costs contro-
ling for risk 
aversion 
−0.12 (n =76) 0.05 (n = 92) 0.07 (n = 76) 0.26*( n = 91) −    
The correlation of risk aversion with effect is 0.22 for the specified individual-cost 367 
information, and is 0.19 if controling for costs; etc. 368 
 369 
 Most effects do not correlate significantly with risk attitude or costs.  Only for 370 
specified individual costs, there are significant nonzero correlations of effects with 371 
risk aversion and with costs.  These correlations are positive, i.e., the more risk averse 372 
people are, and the higher their costs, the more their WTT increases because of the 373 
new information. 374 
 The effects of costs and risk aversion are uncorrelated (r = 0.09, n = 174, 375 
nonsignificant).  Partial correlations, controling for the other factor, are virtually 376 
identical to uncontroled correlations, and the beta-weights of risk aversion and costs 377 
in a regression are almost identical to their correlations. 378 
 The interaction between effect and high or low risk aversion is marginally 379 
significant for total individual costs (F1 = 2.843, p = 0.10) and probabilistic 380 
information (F1 = 3.224, p = 0.08), and significant for specified individual costs (F1 = 381 
5.094, p = 0.03).  The interaction between effect and high or low costs is significant 382 
(F1 = 10.584, p = 0.002). 383 
 384 
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 386 
 The above claims are supported by analyses of subgroups.  Table C.1 in 387 
Appendix C gives complete numerical results.  The first four forms of information, 388 
about costs, are also depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  These figures, while complex at first 389 
sight, serve well to convey the overall patterns in our data, as is explained next.  Line 390 
segments connect WTT before receipt of info with WTT after, so that their increases 391 
and decreases reflect the effects of info.  Each panel illustrates a form of information.  392 
In each panel, a fat line displays the average WTTs and effects for the whole group.  393 
The risk averse subgroup always had the highests WTTs and, thus, generates the 394 
highest line segments, and the risk seeking group generates the lowest.  The high-cost 395 
group always generates the second-highest line segments, and the low-cost group 396 
generates the second-lowest.  All line segments in Fig. 1a increase.  Hence, total 397 
population-cost information increases WTT for all subgroups considered and, 398 
obviously, also for the whole group.  Asterixes indicate that the increases are 399 
significant only for the whole group and for the risk averse group, but not for the 400 
other subgroups in Fig 1a.  Fig. 1b displays similar results for the group that received 401 
information specified per health service.  The changes are all in the same direction as 402 
in Fig. 1a, but to a more pronounced degree, and higher levels of significance are 403 
reached. 404 
 Figure 2 displays the results of individual-cost information instead of population-405 
cost information.  Fig. 2a concerns total-cost information, and suggests differential 406 
effects, with increased WTT for the risk averse clients and for the high cost clients, 407 
and not for others.  The effects are not significant though.  Fig. 2b concerns specified 408 
costs.  The information again differentiates between individuals, but now to a more 409 
pronounced degree.  Specifying costs amplifies the effects of total costs in both 410 
figures. 411 
 Table 7 summarizes the effects found.  We presented the subgroup information in 412 
Figures 1 and 2 because the effects summarized in Table 7 are more easily inferred 413 
from visual inspection of these figures than from the numerical Table C.1 in the 414 
appendix.415 
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 Further, probabilistic information (data given in Table C.1) also increased the 428 
WTT of risk averse clients, and not of risk-seeking clients, as did individual-cost 429 
information.  Costs and interactions therewith could not be observed for probabilistic 430 
information. 431 
3.5.   Subjective Evaluations 432 
 The normalized means and standard deviations of the questions about clarity and 433 
comprehensibility are M = 0.80, SD = 0.24, and M = 0.83, SD = 0.21.  These 434 
questions gave similar results for all three summary statistics (being total costs, 435 
specified costs, and probabilistic information) and are not discussed further.  The two 436 
questions about usefulness distinguished more clearly between summary statistics.  437 
As a usefulness scale we took the normalized average of these two questions.  Its 438 
means (standard deviations) are 0.74 (0.28) for specified costs, 0.58 (0.32) for total 439 
costs, and 0.58 (0.28) for probabilistic information.  The judged usefulness of 440 
specified costs is significantly higher than of the other summary statistics (p ≤ 0.001 441 
in each case); no other difference is significant. 442 
 For each summary statistic, the clients were asked which level of aggregation 443 
they preferred.  Table 8 displays the results for the summary statistics regarding costs.  444 
The summary statistic giving probabilistic information (which could not be given at 445 
the individual level) exhibited a similar pattern, with preference increasing with 446 
individualization.  These results suggest a preference for specified costs and for 447 
individualized information. 448 
differentiates 
individuals(c) 
increases 
  WTT(b) 
enhances 
effects(a) Fig. 1b Fig. 2b specified costs 
population  individual 
Fig. 1a Fig. 2a total costs 
(a): Compare Fig. 1b with Fig. 1a, and Fig. 2b with Fig. 2a. 
(b): See Figs 1a and 1b. 
(c): See Figs 2a and 2b, with increases in WTT for risk  
      aversion and also for high costs, and not for others. 
TABLE 7.  Effects exhibited by Figures 1 and 2; summary of 
effects of information 
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 449 
TABLE 8.  Proportions of preferences for levels of aggregation 450 
 no preference population Reference group individual 
total costs 0.40 0.05 0.15 0.40 
specified costs 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.47 
For specified costs, 47% of the clients prefers to receive the information at the 451 
individual level, 21% at the reference group level, etc. 452 
4.  Discussion of the Findings, and Results on Ambiguity 453 
4.1.  Risk Attitude 454 
 Our finding of considerable risk seeking for losses deviates from the universal 455 
risk aversion often assumed in the economics and insurance literature.  In our domain 456 
of losses with moderate to high probabilities, risk seeking is predicted by prospect 457 
theory (Abdellaoui 2000; Hershey & Schoemaker 1985; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; 458 
Payne, Laughhunn, & Crum 1980; Tversky & Kahneman 1992).  It can be explained 459 
theoretically by an inverse-S shaped probability transformation, which has been 460 
confirmed in many empirical studies (Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto 2000; 461 
Gonzalez & Wu 1999).  Such probability transformations do predict risk aversion for 462 
small-probability losses, which is indeed the common case in insurance.  Prospect 463 
theory, thus, predicts prevailing risk aversion in insurance, which mostly concerns 464 
small-probability losses, and only suggests risk seeking for moderate-to-high 465 
probability losses such as in our data set.  Similar risk seeking was found by Marquis 466 
& Holmer (1996) in a re-analysis of the RAND study of Manning et al. (1987).   467 
 The major factor underlying risk aversion is probably loss aversion (Fischer et al. 468 
1986; Langer & Weber 2001; Pennings & Smidts 2003), which concerns the 469 
overweighting of losses relative to gains.  Loss aversion plays no role in our domain 470 
where no exchanges between gains and losses are involved.  Hence, we avoided 471 
mixed prospects, yielding both gains and losses, in our measurements of risk attitudes, 472 
and do not consider loss aversion. 473 
 On average we find risk neutrality for the loss prospects (Questions L2 and L6).  474 
Therefore, risk seeking is less frequent than suggested by prospect theory.  This may 475 
be caused by the context of insurance in our experiment, even if not stated explicitly 476 
in the prospect choice questions.  It is well known that an insurance context enhances 477 
risk aversion (Hershey, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker 1982, p 949/950; McClelland, 478 
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Schulze, & Coursey 1993).  Let us repeat that health insurance was compulsory for 479 
the clients of the insurance company Zorg en Zekerheid so that they are not more risk 480 
averse than the average 2/3 lowest income part of the Dutch population. 481 
 Our risk-attitude index comprises some insurance-related questions and it is, 482 
therefore, obvious that this index correlates positively with WTT.  Less trivial, but not 483 
surprising either, is the positive relation between WTT and the risk attitudes for the 484 
gain- and loss-prospect choices.  Empirical verifications thereof have, however, been 485 
almost absent from the literature so far.  The reason is that risk attitude is usually 486 
unobservable in insurance studies.  Besides Barsky et al. (1997), discussed later, we 487 
are only aware of Vistnes & Banthin (1997/1998).  They asked about agreement with 488 
the claim “I’m more likely to take risks than the average person,” and found a 489 
negative relation between this index of risk seeking and demand for insurance. 490 
 Relative to the participants of Tversky & Kahneman (1992), our clients deviate 491 
from the predictions of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman found 50% 492 
risky choices in questions G3, G4, G7, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7), always in the direction of 493 
(“rational”) expected value maximization.  This deviation may be caused by the 494 
different population, being average non-rich civilians instead of students.  There is 495 
more agreement with the findings of Birnbaum et al. (1992), who found 50% risky 496 
choices in questions G5 and G6. 497 
 Prospect choices for gains have been studied extensively in the literature, 498 
although mostly for students.  In our sample we find a considerable majority of risk 499 
aversion for gains, in agreement with the common findings in the literature.  This risk 500 
aversion is most clearly seen in questions G2 and G5.  There have not been many 501 
empirical investigations into prospects with loss outcomes.  These prospects are, 502 
however, central in our study because they concern the relevant outcome domain, i.e. 503 
losses ranging from 0 to 200.   504 
 Kahneman & Tversky (1979) found reflection, with attitudes for losses mirroring 505 
those for gains, at the level of group averages, and there we roughly confirm their 506 
findings.  Reflection should not be expected to hold in a very strict sense.  Attitudes 507 
for losses do not completely and exactly mirror those for gains, but are usually less 508 
pronounced and closer to expected value.  For a review of empirical evidence on the 509 
latter point, see Köbberling, Schwieren, & Wakker (2005).  There is no evidence to 510 
support strict reflection at the individual level in the sense that very risk averse clients 511 
for gains will be very risk seeking for losses.  Thus, Cohen, Jaffray, & Said (1987) 512 
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found no relation between risk attitudes for gains and those for losses at the individual 513 
level.  Our evidence provides even stronger counterevidence, with risk aversion for 514 
gains correlating positively with risk aversion for losses rather than negatively. 515 
4.2. Ambiguity Attitude 516 
 An interesting phenomenon appears in the group of 103 clients who received 517 
specified population-costs information.  For these clients, the cost-information that 518 
they received was usually higher than expected: For the average over the seven health 519 
services of the subjective questions with values 7 (costs of health service are much 520 
higher than expected) to 1 (costs are much lower than expected), the mean was 521 
significantly below the neutrality level 4 (t102 = −2.01, p < 0.001).  Hence, likelihood 522 
effects through an increased belief in bad outcomes cannot explain the increased 523 
preference for safety in this group.  This is unlike the group of 83 clients who 524 
received total population-cost information.  For the latter group, the costs that they 525 
were informed about were usually lower than expected (t82 = 3.95, p < 0.001), and 526 
likelihood effects could explain the increased preference for safety.   527 
 For the 103 clients who received specified population-costs information, not only 528 
likelihood effects, but also strategic considerations, with average costs as a signal of 529 
price, are implausible.  This holds the more so as the insurance company is a 530 
nonprofit organization and screening is not permitted.   531 
 More information about the probability distribution, i.e. a reduction of ambiguity 532 
in the technical decision-theoretic sense, while not systematically affecting beliefs, 533 
did systematically decrease the preference value of the uncertainty.  By the current 534 
conventions of decision theory, this finding must be interpreted as ambiguity seeking, 535 
contrary to the hypothesis of universal ambiguity aversion that is most popular in 536 
decision theory today.  We suggest that attitudes towards ambiguity (being closer or 537 
farther away from objective statistical probabilities) are less central in human decision 538 
making than commonly thought, and that other aspects generated this finding.  The 539 
situation with the extra statistical information is less natural for the clients than the 540 
situation without it, because insurance decisions that people make many times in their 541 
life and are familiar with are virtually always made without statistical information.  542 
Thus, people prefer natural situations, where they can better justify their decision to 543 
others (Trautmann & Vieider 2006). 544 
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 In general, naturalness of the decision situation, rather than remoteness to an 545 
objective-probability state of knowledge, affects preference.  In the classical Ellsberg 546 
(1961) paradoxes, a gamble on urns with compositions kept secret is less natural than 547 
one where the composition is known, and this rather than remoteness to the objective-548 
probability state drives preference (Viscusi & Magat 1992, p. 380).  Many studies 549 
have argued for the importance of emotional aspects of uncertain information other 550 
than ambiguity (Chow & Sarin 2001; di Mauro & Maffioletti 2002; Fox & Tversky 551 
1995, 1998; Fox & Weber 2002; Heath & Tversky 1991; Kilka & Weber 1999; 552 
Tversky & Fox 1995; Wakker 2004).  The difficulty to control for likelihood effects 553 
explains why studies of ambiguity attitudes have been restricted almost exclusively to 554 
artificial setups with information kept secret such as Ellsberg urns, setups that are 555 
systematically biased against the ambiguous events. 556 
 Another effect that can underly our finding concerns the reflection effect for 557 
ambiguity at the group level.  It entails that prevailing ambiguity aversion for gains is 558 
combined with prevailing ambiguity seeking for losses.  Most studies of ambiguity 559 
have considered gains, and little is known about ambiguity for losses.  Keren & 560 
Gerritsen (1999) found ambiguity aversion for losses, as commonly assumed in 561 
theoretical studies, and contrary to the reflection effect.  Several other studies, 562 
however, found ambiguity seeking for high-probability losses (di Mauro & Maffioletti 563 
2002; Goldsmith & Sahlin 1983; Ho, Keller, & Keltyka 2002; Hogarth & Kunreuther 564 
1985; Hogarth & Kunreuther 1989; Kahn & Sarin 1988; Viscusi & Chesson 1999), in 565 
agreement with the reflection effect.  Mixed results are in Cohen, Jaffray, & Said 566 
(1987), Dobbs (1991), Einhorn & Hogarth (1986), and Mangelsdorff & Weber 567 
(1994).  The empirical findings of ambiguity seeking for losses agree with our 568 
findings, and cast further doubt on the universal ambiguity aversion commonly 569 
assumed in theoretical studies. 570 
4.3. Emotional Factors 571 
 Many recent studies in decision theory have emphasized the importance of 572 
emotional factors in decision making (Elster 1998).  Emotional factors may explain 573 
the stronger effects found after specified-costs information and the increased WTT 574 
after population-cost information at the end of Section 3.  Clients may react stronger 575 
to specified costs simply because these costs take more attention and, thus, arouse 576 
more negative emotions (Hsee & Kunreuther 2000).  Similar splitting effects have 577 
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been observed in other fields (Bateman et al. 1997; Carson at al. 1992; Starmer & 578 
Sugden 1993; Weber, Eisenführ, & von Winterfeldt 1988). 579 
 The increased WTT that we found under risk aversion and not under risk seeking 580 
is opposite to regression to the mean: the group with a higher-than-average prior WTT 581 
exhibits an even higher WTT posterior.  A psychological explanation could be the 582 
confirmation bias (reviewed by Klayman 1995), a phenomenon known under various 583 
other names (Suen 2004).  It entails that people select only that part of new 584 
information that confirms their previous viewpoints, leading to more extreme 585 
viewpoints.  The confirmation bias would, however, suggest similar effects for 586 
population-cost information, contrary to our findings. 587 
4.4. Policy Implications 588 
 The observed increase in WTT for high-cost clients, which enhances adverse 589 
selection,7 may be desirable from the client’s short-term perspective, but is 590 
undesirable from the societal perspective in the context of insurance (Hirshleifer 591 
1971; Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976).  Information about risks usually decreases the 592 
willingness to share these risks.  Adverse selection can lead to a premium spiral and 593 
the breakdown of insurance (Akerlof 1970; Finkelstein 2004). 594 
 The positive relations that we found between effect and risk aversion seem to be 595 
desirable.  Risk aversion is usually considered the normative basis for insurance.  596 
When consumers are risk averse there can be a market for insurance with benefits for 597 
all, if moral hazard and transaction costs are not too large.  The domain of this 598 
research, however, concerns small losses, ranging to Dfl. 200, that occur with 599 
moderate to high probabilities.  For example, 83.2% of the clients in our sample had 600 
nonzero costs and 57.1% had costs exceeding Dfl. 200.  Contrary to what theoretical 601 
studies of insurance often assume, empirical studies have found considerable risk 602 
seeking in such domains.  We suggest desirability of insurance only for the risk averse 603 
                                               
7
 Adverse selection usually arises from asymmetric information.  In our study, the insurance company 
possesses the information about individual expenses and it might seem that adverse selection cannot 
arise.  However, the insurance company should specify premiums in a uniform manner beforehand and 
is not permitted to use the cost information to adjust premiums.  Such a use of information would 
constitute a violation of the privacy rights of clients.  Thus, screening is excluded (Shapira & Venezia 
1999), and adverse selection can occur here as it does in cases of asymmetric information (Bundorf & 
Simon 2006). 
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clients in our sample.  For risk neutral and risk seeking clients, their risk attitude 604 
provides an argument against insurance.  Stability of expenses and the solidarity 605 
principle (helping risk averse clients to take insurance) remain as arguments in favor 606 
of insurance for such clients. 607 
 The normative debate becomes more fundamental if the observed risk attitudes 608 
are not taken as given, but are opened to debate.  It can be argued that risk neutrality 609 
is rational for the small stakes considered in this investigation.  We assumed, 610 
however, that risk attitudes are to be taken as they are.  The normative discussions of 611 
optimal decisions in McFadden (2006 pp. 20-21) and Winter et al. (2006, p. 7932) did 612 
not consider subjective risk attitudes of clients, but used expected-value 613 
maximization. 614 
 For a practical implementation of the provision of information about individual 615 
costs, legal guarantees for privacy protection of clients would be the major concern.  616 
This topic lies outside the scope of this paper. 617 
5. Discussion of Methods 618 
 For gains, the median number of risky choices was 4, which, under expected 619 
utility with power utility (“constant relative risk aversion”) corresponds with a utility 620 
function U(x) = xr for any 0.77 ≤ r < 1.  Thus, the median risk aversion index 1−r is 621 
between 0 and 0.23.  For losses, the median number of risky choices was 3, which, 622 
under expected utility with power utility, corresponds with a utility function U(−x) = 623 
−(−x)r for any 1.097 ≤ r ≤ 1.186.  This function is close to linear, and is slightly 624 
concave.  We could similarly have related the number of risky choices of every 625 
individual to powers of utility and risk aversion indexes.  Such indexes and analyses 626 
are, however, based on expected utility theory.  There is much empirical evidence that 627 
this theory is violated descriptively (Starmer 2000), and for this reason we preferred 628 
not to use indexes as just described.   629 
 Our main conclusions, obtained through a median split analysis, are based only 630 
on the following two assumptions: (a) Questions L2 and L6 provide a risk neutrality 631 
benchmark; (b) Individuals are more risk averse as they choose more safe options.  632 
These assumptions are uncontroversial.  Hence we did not need to resort to models 633 
such as prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992), that are descriptively better 634 
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than expected utility but are analytically more complex to use and are less widely 635 
known. 636 
 Because population-cost information always preceded reference-group 637 
information, which always preceded individual information, order effects and 638 
interactions may obviously have arisen.  These may explain the weak effects of 639 
reference-group information.  The individual-cost information was sufficiently 640 
different to suggest independent factors.  Because of the large numbers of forms of 641 
information to be examined8, there were not enough clients for a counterbalanced 642 
setup.  Given that sequential information could not be avoided, the chosen order of 643 
information, progressively individualized, is most natural (which was also a reason 644 
for not considering randomized orders).  If order and interaction effects are deemed 645 
crucial, the effects of individual-cost information should be re-interpreted as effects of 646 
individual-cost information joint with the preceding information. 647 
 One explanation for the general increase of WTT after population-cost 648 
information may be that, given the skewed nature of health expenses, for most clients 649 
the population averages will be larger than their own expenses, so that this 650 
information makes them more pessimistic, generating an increase of WTT.  Our 651 
primary research interest, however, does not concern the marketing perspective of 652 
maximizing WTT.  It, instead, concerns the prescriptive purpose of helping clients 653 
making decisions optimal for them.  For the latter, results differentiating between 654 
individuals are important, and this differentiation is not affected by general increases 655 
or decreases of WTT such as possibly generated by the order effects due to prior 656 
information about averages, information that does not differentiate between 657 
individuals.  Some other order effects cannot be excluded either because of the fixed 658 
order of other questions in this research.  For example, the risk-attitude questions 659 
were always asked at the beginning of the interview and thereby always preceded the 660 
WTT questions.  Our main conclusions are based on differences within (“effects”) 661 
and between individuals, and these are not affected by fixed biases generated by such 662 
order effects. 663 
                                               
8
 5 between-subject levels of summary stastistics (3 reported), and risk-averse/risk-seeking and high-
costs/low-costs, yields 5 × 4 = 20 subgroups.  The insurance company Zorg en Zekerheid wanted as 
many forms of information to be tested as possible.  By accepting order effects, we could test three 
times more forms of information. 
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 An important step forward was made in experimental economics when the 664 
importance of real and performance-contingent, rather than hypothetical, incentives 665 
became widely understood (Binmore 1999; Smith 1982).  Unfortunately, we could 666 
measure WTT only through hypothetical survey questions, due to practical 667 
limitations.  It would be preferable to elicit WTT from real choices, such as in the 668 
famous RAND study (Manning et al. 1987), and this is a topic for future research. 669 
 We neither used real incentives in the measurement of risk attitude, even though 670 
they could have been implemented easily there.  We omitted them deliberately, for the 671 
following reasons.  First, our clients, taken from the general population, participated 672 
voluntarily to help their insurance company, and thereby were intrinsically motivated.  673 
We expected that the clients’ motivation would be negatively affected (crowded out) 674 
by monetary rewards.  The latter holds the more so as a health insurance company 675 
such as Zorg en Zekerheid, the company that initiated this research, is supposed to 676 
bring security, and not to engage its clients in frivolous gambling for money.  Frey & 677 
Jegen (2001) extensively discussed crowding-out effects.  In Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2/3 678 
of the subjects participating in a health experiment did not accept the €12 flat payment 679 
offered to them, and preferred to participate for free.  In general, many health 680 
investigations are funded by charity donations. 681 
 The second reason for not using real incentives in our measurement of risk 682 
attitude is that, for the insurance questions considered in this experiment, the relevant 683 
outcomes are losses, and the implementation of losses is problematic.  Third, for the 684 
simple choices with moderate stakes considered here, it has been commonly found 685 
that the presence or absence of real incentives does not affect clients’ choices much 686 
(Camerer & Hogarth 1999, pp. 8, 34; for insurance decisions, see Irwin, McClelland, 687 
& Schulze 1992; see also Hertwig & Ortmann 2001).  von Winterfeldt & Edwards 688 
(1986, pp. 222/223) and Pennings & Smidts (2000) discussed the general issue of 689 
using nonbehavioral data for predicting decisions. 690 
 Barsky et al. (1997) used survey questions to measure the risk attitudes of N = 691 
11,707 participants in the Health and Retirement Study of 1992.  The participants 692 
were given a hypothetical choice between a stable income for the rest of their life, or a 693 
fifty-fifty chance of either two or x times this income.  In a first question, x = 2/3 was 694 
chosen and, depending on the answer, either x = 1/2 or x = 4/5 was chosen in a second 695 
question.  In this manner, four classes of increasingly risk averse participants could be 696 
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distinguished, containing 64.6%, 11.6%, 10.9%, and 12.8% of the participants.  697 
Unlike our study, Barsky et al. did have information about real behavior.  They found 698 
that the hypothetical survey questions about risk attitude predicted actual behavior 699 
regarding health insurance, smoking, drinking, choosing risky employment, and 700 
investments. 701 
6.  Conclusions 702 
 The risk attitudes that we observed were between the predictions of prospect 703 
theory and expected value maximization.  In particular, we found no risk aversion for 704 
loss outcomes, contrary to the classical economic predictions.  Customer satisfaction 705 
was improved by information, most by specified individual-cost information.  706 
 A reduction of ambiguity seemed to decrease rather than increase the value of 707 
uncertain options, suggesting ambiguity seeking rather than aversion.  Apparently the 708 
more familiar option, rather than the one with known probabilities, is preferred, 709 
contrary to the common interpretation of the Ellsberg paradox.  In most real-life 710 
decisions probabilities are unknown.  We therefore conjecture that no special aversion 711 
to unknown probabilities holds in real-life decisions.  712 
 The following policy recommendations result from our study, where specification 713 
of costs per health service always reinforces the effects of total-cost information.  714 
From the marketing perspective of maximizing the number of insurances sold, 715 
population-cost information is optimal.  From the (short-term) individual perspective 716 
of the client, individual-cost information seems to be most desirable because it 717 
enhances insurance taking for risk averse clients and for clients with high costs.  From 718 
the societal perspective, individual-cost information is interesting.  Its drawback of 719 
adverse selection is probably too serious to be compensated by the advantages of 720 
favorable interaction with risk attitude, increased customer satisfaction, and increased 721 
awareness of medical expenses among the general public. 722 
 Prospect theory played a crucial role in this study.  First, it explains why we did 723 
not find universal risk aversion in the risk-attitude questions for the relevant outcomes 724 
in this investigation.  Second, it explains why additional information about 725 
probabilities led to higher risk aversion even if there were no apparent increases in 726 
perceived likelihoods of losses.  We, finally, followed its recommendation that for the 727 
measurement of risk attitude for insurance, mixed gambles with both gains and losses 728 
are better avoided.  The pronounced risk aversion found in mixed prospects is due to 729 
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loss aversion rather than to the risk attitude for losses as relevant for insurance.  Thus, 730 
descriptive insights from prospect theory served to derive prescriptive implications in 731 
this study.  We hope that this study, carried out with a large sample of non-academic 732 
clients and dealing with natural choices, can contribute to a further understanding of 733 
risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, the use of descriptive theories such as prospect 734 
theory for prescriptive applications, the effects of risk information on consumer 735 
decisions, and, finally, to the usefulness of statistical information to help clients make 736 
better insurance decisions. 737 
Appendix A 738 
Discussion of Our Constructions of Scales 739 
 Questions L2, and to some extent L6, while allowing a direct calibration of risk 740 
aversion versus risk seeking at the group level, in isolation are not very reliable 741 
indexes of risk aversion at the individual level.  We, therefore, used the risk aversion 742 
index based on 17 items to order clients regarding their risk aversion.  Given that 743 
findings on risk attitudes for losses are controversial, we included the gain questions 744 
in our experiment primarily to verify that our design in itself does not comprise 745 
deviations from common designs.  In addition, gain questions are easier to understand 746 
for participants.  We decided to include these items in the risk aversion index so as to 747 
increase reliability, supported by the significantly positive correlation between the 748 
gain- and loss risk aversion indexes and between the gain-index and WTT.  A 749 
drawback is that gain questions concern different outcomes than the losses considered 750 
in insurance. 751 
 For the scale of risk attitude, we added the choices framed as insurance decisions 752 
for reasons of validity.  Stability of costs constitutes an important motive, especially 753 
for our clients who have low incomes, to take supplemental insurance against an 754 
unforeseen payment of Dfl. 200, and is an essential component of their risk aversion, 755 
but static questions do not measure it.  This motive contributes to the higher risk 756 
aversion found in insurance decisions than in other risky choices (Hershey, 757 
Kunreuther, & Schoemaker 1982, p. 949/950).  We similary maintained question L7 758 
even though it reduced reliability, because high-probability losses such as in L7 are 759 
relevant to many clients. 760 
 Because the willingness to take supplemental insurance is central in our analysis, 761 
we measured it in several ways in a pilot experiment.  Besides the WTT question used 762 
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in our analyses9, the same question was asked but with the planned premium specified 763 
(Dfl. 11 per month).  Further, in a willingness-to-pay question, clients answered which 764 
premium they were willing to pay for supplemental insurance, both per month and per 765 
year.   766 
 The WTT question without premium specified appeared to be easiest for the 767 
clients and gave the best results.  In debriefings at the end of our pilot studies, clients 768 
adhered more to the results of these questions than of the other questions, and 769 
expressed preference for these questions.  This finding first came as a surprise to us.  770 
From an economic perspective, the decision to buy insurance cannot be sensibly made 771 
without the premium specified.  Psychologically, however, the evaluation of a 772 
commodity is more basic than, and prior to, a decision of whether or not to buy the 773 
commodity at some specific price.  A disadvantage of WTT with a premium specified 774 
is that the problem is then perceived as a dichotomous decision problem, where either 775 
the insurance is to be bought or not.  For WTT without a premium specified, clients 776 
better differentiated their evaluations.  Willingness-to-pay questions are notorious for 777 
their empirical problems.  In view of these findings we decided, contrary to our prior 778 
plans, to use WTT without premium specified in the main study.  Obviously, the 779 
higher the WTT, the higher the premium that a client wants to pay.  This was 780 
confirmed in statistical analyses not reported here. 781 
 For the averages of total and specified costs, only the averages of costs truncated 782 
at Dfl. 200 are relevant to the decision problem faced by the clients, the deductible 783 
being Dfl. 200.10  We nevertheless used averages of untruncated costs because these 784 
are easier to understand for the clients and because an additional purpose of the 785 
provision of information was to make the clients more aware of health expenses in 786 
general. 787 
 788 
789 
                                               
9
 The formulation of the question (translated from Dutch):  “Imagine that a deductible will become 
compulsory within the near future.  Then would you like to take supplemental insurance, so that you 
need not pay the first 200 guilders yourself?  1:  certainly not …; 7: certainly yes.”  The question was 
read to the client by the interviewer. 
10
 The average population costs truncated at Dfl. 200 was Dfl. 125 per year.  The planned premium was 
approximately Dfl. 132 per year. 
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Appendix B 789 
 790 
The visual display of prospect choices G4 and L6 791 
 792 
 793 
 794 
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 807 
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 809 
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 813 
 814 
 815 
 816 
 817 
 818 
 819 
 820 
 821 
 
            CHOICE A: 
 
You turn the Wheel of fortune.  
If you end up in the white area, 
you receive 100 guilders.  If 
you end up in the black area 
you receive nothing. 
5% 
95% 
      CHOICE B: 
 
 
 
 
 
You receive 14 guilders 
   MY CHOICE IS: 
 
 
 
 
 
        A           B 
            CHOICE A: 
 
You turn the Wheel of misfortune.   
If you end up in the black area, you 
have to pay 200 guilders.  If you 
end up in the white area you pay 
nothing. 
10% 
90% 
      CHOICE B: 
 
 
 
 
 
You pay 23 guilders 
   MY CHOICE IS: 
 
 
 
 
 
        A           B 
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Explanation of the questionnaire “the wheel of fortune” 822 
 823 
The questionnaire consists of seven questions.  Each time, you can choose between 824 
two options (choice A and choice B). 825 
 826 
Choice A; 827 
If you choose choice A, you have a chance of gaining an amount of money and a 828 
chance to win nothing.  The “wheel of fortune” indicates how large your probability is 829 
of winning a specific amount of money. 830 
 831 
Choice B; 832 
If you choose choice B, you are sure to win a specific amount of money. 833 
 834 
Appendix C 835 
Complete Numerical Results of Subgroups 836 
 total popu-
lation costs 
specified popu-
lation costs 
total indivi-
dual costs 
specified indivi-
dual costs 
probabilistic 
Risk 
averse 
Before: .67 (.41)  
after: .79* (.35) 
before: .72 (.33) 
after: .85** (.25) 
before: .67 (.41) 
after: .76 (.37) 
before: .72 (.33) 
after: .83* (.27) 
before: .65 (.38) 
after: .76* (.30) 
Risk 
seeking 
Before: .36 (.39) 
after: .39 (.40) 
before: .45 (.42) 
after: .55* (.43) 
before: .36 (.39) 
after: .33 (.40) 
before: .46 (.42) 
after: .40 (.43) 
before: .44 (.39) 
after: .44 (.33) 
costs 
high 
Before: .50 (.44) 
after: .55 (.44) 
before: .62 (.37) 
after: .75** (.35) 
before: .50 (.44) 
after: .56 (.45) 
before: .62 (.37) 
after: .77*** (.35) − 
costs 
low 
Before: .50 (.41) 
after: .61ms (.42) 
before: .55 (.42) 
after: .61 (.41) 
before: .50 (.41) 
after: .51 (.44) 
before: .56 (.42) 
after: .47 (.43) − 
Risk 
averse & 
costs high 
Before: .68 (.40) 
after: .70 (.41) 
before: .71 (.31) 
after: .87** (.24) 
before: .68 (.40) 
after: .73 (.40) 
before: .71 (.31) 
after: .92*** (.15) − 
Risk 
averse & 
costs low 
Before: .64 (.43) 
after: .89 (.26) 
before: .71 (.37) 
after: .83 (.26) 
before: .64 (.43) 
after: .79 (.36) 
before: .71 (.37) 
after: .70 (.35) − 
Risk see-
king & 
costs high 
Before: .33 (.41) 
after: .41 (.43) 
before: .50 (.44) 
after: .62 (.43) 
before: .33 (.41) 
after: .40 (.44) 
before: .50 (.44) 
after: .58 (.45) − 
Risk see-
king & 
costs low 
Before: .37 (.34) 
after: .34 (.35) 
before: .42 (.43) 
after: .49 (.42) 
before: .37 (.34) 
after: .23* (.33) 
before: .44 (.43) 
after: .28ms (.38) − 
TABLE C.1.  Mean WTT before and after receipt of information, for five forms of 837 
information and for risk averse, risk seeking, high cost, and low cost clients.  838 
Significant changes (effects) are underlined. 839 
840 
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